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18 January 2021
Contents
1 Quantum gravity and philosophy 2
2 Worlds without spacetime? 4
3 Challenges to spacetime emergence 7
4 Physical salience 9
5 Non-commutative geometry 13
6 Spacetime functionalism 15
7 The role of philosophy in physics 21
8 The plan for the book 22
“Big Bang Machine Could Destroy Earth”
. . . ran an attention grabbing headline in The Sunday Times (Leake 1999), regarding the new
Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. To be fair, the main
apocalyptic concern of the paper was that the RHIC would create a form of matter in which strange
quarks eat the up and down quarks found in ordinary matter. But it also discussed the possibility
that experiments involving high-energy collision of gold ions could create microscopic blackholes,
which would pull all the matter in the world into them. Such scenarios were taken seriously enough
that they were evaluated by a panel of elders, who concluded that the chances of any such events
were utterly minuscule (Busza et al. 1999)—happily, up to the time of writing, they have not been
contradicted by events at Brookhaven!
∗This is a chapter of the planned monograph Out of Nowhere: The Emergence of Spacetime in Quantum Theories
of Gravity, co-authored by Nick Huggett and Christian Wüthrich and under contract with Oxford University Press.
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Let’s look into the business of black hole formation more carefully to explain why physics needs
an account of quantum gravity. First, the RHIC was built to probe how matter behaves under
intense temperatures and pressures—in effect recreating in a tiny region the state of the universe
within the first second of its existence, when quarks and gluons flowed in a plasma rather than
binding to form particles. The predictions tested here are largely those of quantum chromodynam-
ics, the quantum theory of the strong force binding nucleons and their constituents. That is, the
collisions between heavy nuclei such as gold in the RHIC are governed by the laws of quantum
mechanics (QM).
The concern over black holes, however, arises when one asks how general relativity (GR)—the
classical, non-quantum, theory of gravity, gets into the picture. According to GR, the spacetime
metric outside a sphere of mass M takes the form:





whereG is Newton’s gravitational constant, c is the speed of light, and r the distance from the center.
(ds2 is the infinitesimal spacetime ‘distance’ squared—the ‘interval’—between two radial points
separated in time by dt and space by dr, in suitable co-ordinates; though an exact understanding
is not crucial here.) What is important is that this quantity blows up when 2GM = rc2, or
r = 2GM/c2. Understanding this occurrence was an important issue in the early development of
GR, but what it actually signifies is the presence of an ‘event horizon’ around the mass, from which
neither matter nor light can escape—the boundary of a black hole. Of course this story only makes
sense if the mass is all located within a radius of 2GM/c2, since the metric formula only holds
outside the mass. So one can equally well say that if one has a mass M it will only form a black
hole if it is all located within a radius less than 2GM/c2.
So finally, the question posed by the panel at Brookhaven was how small a region would the
amount of energy to be created in collisions be located (see page 7 of the report)? Acting cautiously,
they assumed the best conditions for black hole formation, supposing that all the energy produced
by the collision contributes to the mass: about 50 times that of a gold atom. For a black hole of
this mass the event horizon has a radius of 10−39m. On the other hand, a gold atom has a radius
of around 10−12m, so even supposing that all the energy is concentrated in a region the size of a
suitably Lorentz-contracted nucleus, general relativity predicts that collisions will be many, many
orders of magnitude from creating a black hole.
Phew.1
1 Quantum gravity and philosophy
What we have then is an argument that the physics of Brookhaven lies within the domain of
relativistic QM, but that the gravitational effects of the collisions are utterly negligible. Perhaps
the world is just ‘dappled’ in this way: in some domains, such as the motions of the planets (GR
explains the perihelion of Mercury, for instance) GR holds and QM is irrelevant; in others, as
in RHIC, it is QM that holds sway, with GR entering only to provide a background geometry
determined by ambient bodies, not by the system under consideration. But the very argument
here shows that it is possible to bring considerations from both theories to bear on a single system,
1Don’t be confused if you have read of black holes being created at RHIC. In fact what has (perhaps) been
observed is the Unruh effect, which is formally equivalent to Hawking radiation, but does not involve black holes, but
acceleration, which is in a sense indistinguishable from a gravitational force according to GR. See Nastase (2005).
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making clear that one can sensibly ask whether there are domains in which both theories apply.
On our current understanding of the universe indeed there are. In the first place, there is the big
bang, which is entailed by GR given the current state of the universe, in which matter becomes
so hot and compact that QM effects will necessarily occur. (And conversely, if the inflationary
hypothesis is correct, between the first 10−33 to 10−32s quantum fields provide the energy which
drives the expansion of the universe, according to the laws of GR.) In the second, Hawking radiation
is predicted to occur around black holes as a QM effect resulting from the geometry of spacetime
given by GR (Hawking 1974). Indeed, assuming that the local equivalence of acceleration and
gravity—the ‘equivalence principle’—holds in the quantum domain, then RHIC does provide tests
for this physics, since the radiation produced by decelerating ions can be measured (see footnote
1): under the assumption, it provides indirect tests of the overlap of gravity and QM.
Thus, we say, the ultimate need for a theory that in some way unifies QM and GR—a theory
of quantum gravity (QG)— arises from the existence of phenomena in our universe in which the
domains of the two overlap. There are other, more theoretical, arguments for such a theory and
concerning the form it should take. For a critical evaluation of these, arguing that overlap is best
reason to seek quantum gravity, and that empirical considerations best dictate its form see Callender
and Huggett (2001); for further discussion Wüthrich (2005).2
There are then good reasons for physicists to investigate QG. This book is predicated on the
view that it also has an important call on the efforts of philosophers. Indeed, we would like this
work to encourage, by example, our colleagues to be more adventurous in their choice of topics of
enquiry. Philosophy of physics, we suggest, has a tendency to look too much to the past, and to the
metaphysics of well-established physics (and of course to internecine disputes): classical statistical
mechanics, classical spacetime theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are ‘so twentieth (or
even nineteenth) century’, and yet have a virtual lock on the discipline. While quantum field theory
(QFT) is becoming a significant topic, that is still at least half a century behind the physics!
We’re overstating things somewhat for effect here: of course, even old theories do face important
foundational problems, and their consequences for our broader understanding of the world take
considerable elucidation. And of course it is unfair to suggest that no philosophers of physics show
an interest in contemporary physics. Indeed, since we started writing this book, there has been
an explosion of interest in QG, especially amongst a younger generation of scholars, which we find
very exciting. Still, we do say that collectively the discipline pays insufficient attention to cutting
edge physics, and hope this book in some way serves as an impetus to greater engagement.
Our point is not that novelty is good for its own sake, nor that philosophy is a ‘hand-maiden’,
who should dutifully follow the fashions of physics. Rather, we are inspired by recent work in the
history and philosophy of science to believe that it is central to the business of philosophy to engage
with developing physical theories—both because the search for philosophical knowledge must be
responsive to empirical discoveries, and because philosophy has important contributions to make to
the development of physics (and other sciences). We will discuss this point at greater length below
(§7), to explain our aims and motivations.
First, in part to make that discussion more concrete, in §2 we will very briefly introduce some
theories of QG (or in its vicinity). We especially want to focus on a rather generic feature of them—
that in various ways they do not contain familiar spacetime at a fundamental level, but rather it
‘emerges’ (in a sense to be discussed) in a higher, non-fundamental domain. That will lead us to
a discussion (in §3) of the challenges to the very idea that something a seemingly fundamental as
2This situation may change if the technology improves enough over the next few years to carry out the experiment
proposed by Bose et al. (2017).
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spacetime could be derivative, from even more fundamental, yet non-spatiotemporal, physics. We
then address these challenges, analyzing how they can be overcome, and illustrating this process
in a historical case (§4); and in a short contemporary example (§5). This discussion encapsulates
much of the work of the book: the chapters introduce, for philosophers, several proposals for a
theory of QG, discuss the ways in which they eliminate spatiotemporal structures, and investigates
the ways in which they are recovered as effective, apparent structures. What we propose is a form
of ‘functionalism’, so in §6 we explain that position.
In a final section (§8) we will give an overview of the different strategies one might take towards
quantizing gravity, to relate the different proposals that we will consider in the book.
2 Worlds without spacetime?
All theories of QG are, to a large extent, speculative; some of the examples that follow are more
speculative than others. However, as we shall explain below, there are good reasons to think that
they may still teach important lessons in the search for QG. The first three examples are the focus
of the following chapters; the remaining two are also illuminating, but we have discussed them
elsewhere.
• Causal Set Theory (CST): As we will see in chapters 2 and 3, CST makes liberal use
of GR as a vantage point for its research programme. In fact, it takes its most important
motivation from theorems stating that given the causal structure of a spacetime, its metric
is determined up to a conformal factor. In other words, the causal structure determines the
geometry of a spacetime—but not its ‘size’. Taking this cue, CST posits that the fundamental
structure is a set of elementary events which are locally finite, partially ordered by a basic
causal relation. In other words, the fundamental structure is a causal set. The assumption of
local finitarity is nothing but the formal demand that the fundamental structure—whatever
else it is—is discrete. Together with the demand of Lorenz invariance at the derived level, the
discreteness of causal sets forces a rather odd locality structure onto the elementary events of
the causal set (§3.5). Furthermore, although the fundamental relation of causal precedence
can double up as something akin to temporal precedence, space is altogether lost in a causal
set (§2.3). Jointly, these facts entail that the structure we are facing in causal set theory is
also rather different from the spacetime encountered in GR. In fact, the quantum nature of
the causal sets yet to be incorporated into causal set theory is bound to further complicate
the picture and to remove the resulting structure from that of relativistic spacetimes.
• Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG): LQG starts out from a Hamiltonian formulation of GR
and attempts to use a recipe for cooking up a quantum from a classical theory that has been
utilized with great success in other areas of physics. This recipe is the so-called canonical
quantization. The goal of applying the canonical quantization procedure is to find the phys-
ical Hilbert space, i.e. the space of admissible physical states, and the operators defined on
it that correspond to genuinely physical quantities. As will be seen in chapters 4-5, following
this recipe leads rather straightforwardly into a morass of deep conceptual, interpretative,
and technical issues concerning the dynamics of the theory as well as on time quite generally.
We find that the states in the ‘kinematic’ Hilbert space afford a natural geometric interpreta-
tion: its elements are states that give rise to physical space, yet are discrete structures with a
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disordered locality structure. At least in one basis of this Hilbert space, the states appear to
be states of a granular structure, welding together tiny ‘atoms’ of space(time). It is crucial to
this picture that these atoms of space(time) are atoms in the original meaning of the word:
they are the truly indivisible smallest pieces of space(time). The smooth space(time) of the
classical can thus be seen to be supplanted by a discrete quantum structure. Moreover, since
generically a state of this structure will be a superposition of basis states with a determinate
geometry, generic states will not possess determinate geometric properties. If continuity, lo-
cality, or determinate geometry was an essential property of spacetime, then whatever the
fundamental structure is, it is not spacetime. In this sense, spacetime is eliminated from the
fundamental theory.
• String Theory: According to string theory (chapter 6) tiny one-dimensional objects move
around space, wiggling as they go—the different kinds of vibration correspond to different
masses (charges and spins) and hence to different subatomic particles. So it sounds as if
spacetime is built into the theory in a pretty straight-forward way; however, we will see that
things are not so simple. First, in chapter 7 we will see that various versions which are intu-
itively very different in fact correspond to the same physics—are ‘dual ’. For instance, suppose
that at least one of the dimensions of space is ‘compactified’, or circular. Then it turns out
that a theory in which the circumference of the dimension is C has the same collection of
values for physical quantities as a theory in which the circumference is 1/C: i.e., that theories
in which compactified dimensions are small are physically indistinguishable from—or ‘dual’
to— those in which they are large. Other dualities relate spaces of different topologies. These
facts raise important questions about whether the space in which the string lives is the one we
observe, since that is definitely large though the string space could be small, or even conven-
tional. Second, in chapters 8-9, we will see how the geometrical structure of spacetime—and
indeed GR—arises from the behavior of large collections of strings in a ‘graviton’ state, the
quantum particle that mediates gravitational forces.
• Group Field Theory: Consider rotations, by and angle θ, in the plane: a different one for
each value of 0 ≤ θ < 2π. These form a group under composition: a rotation by α followed
by an angle β is just a rotation by α + β (and for example, a rotation by 2π − α undoes a
rotation by α). Similarly for rotations in three dimensions, and indeed similarly for Lorentz
transformations (which are in fact nothing rotations in Minkowski spacetime), and so on. For
each, composition yields a different function from any pair to third. We can thus characterize
the abstract group structure simply by the action of this function of an entirely arbitrary set
of elements—forget that we started with rotations, and let the elements be anything, with a
composition rule isomorphic to that of the rotations. One could take then a set of such blank
elements, which compose like rotations in the plane, but which should not be thought of as
literal rotations: no plane at all is postulated, the only manifold is that formed by the group
elements themselves—the circle of points with labels 0−2π, not a 2-dimensional plane.3 And
finally one can introduce a field on this group manifold, a real number for each group element,
with a dynamical law for its evolution; and indeed quantize this field. As we have emphasized,
while physical space was used to guide the construction of this theory, it is not an explicit
3More accurately, the space that is assumed is not the space of relativistic physics, or that of planar rotations,
but four copies of the group of Minkowski rotations.
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component of it, and yet models of general relativity can be derived from it. This example is
discussed in greater detail in Oriti (2014) and Huggett (2018).
• Non-Commutative Geometry: Picture a Euclidean rectangle whose sides lie along two
coordinate axes, so that the lengths of its sides are x and y—its area is x · y = y · x. But
what if such products fail to commute, xy 6= yx, so that area is no longer a sensible quan-
tity? How can we understand such a thing—a non-commutative geometry? By abandoning
ordinary images of geometry in terms of a literal space (such as the plane) and presenting it
in an alternative, algebraic way. In fact, our example already starts to do so: even thinking
about areas as products of co-ordinates uses Descartes’ algebraic approach to Euclidean ge-
ometry. Once we have entered the realm of algebra, all kinds of possible modifications arise.
Especially, an abstract algebra A requires an operation of ‘multiplication’, ?, but this can be
a quite general map from pairs of elements, ? : A×A → A, which need not be commutative!
For instance, one could define ‘multiplication’ to satisfy x ? y − y ? x = θ (a small number),
and use it to generate polynomials in x and y; these carry geometric information. Such a
thing is perfectly comprehensible from the abstract point of view of algebra, but it cannot be
given a familiar Euclidean interpretation via Cartesian geometry. So, such a theory seems to
describe a world that is fundamentally algebraic, not spatial (in the ordinary sense)—there
is x ? y and y ? x but no literal rectangle. If there is thus fundamentally nothing ‘in’ space,
is the ultimate ontology ‘structural’, based on algebraic relations only? And how could an
appearance of familiar (commutative!) space arise; especially, what significance could point-
valued quantities have? We will return to this example in §3.
All of these examples are speculative to some extent or other, and none can claim to be a com-
plete quantum theory of gravity (and none has convincing, currently testable, novel predictions!),
yet all have some claim to model relevant physical features of QG, worth exploring. In particular,
we have emphasized in each case how spacetime features are missing in the theories (to be spelled
out in detail in later chapters). This situation thus appears to be a common condition of many
approaches to QG, in which case we say that classical, relativistic spacetime is ‘emergent’. We
emphasize (as we have elsewhere) that we do not use this term in its strongest philosophical sense
to indicate the inexplicability of X from Y: as some have claimed life or mind emerges from matter.
On the contrary, we argue that classical spacetime structures can be explained in more fundamental
terms: indeed, it was largely to explicate how physicists do so that we wrote the book. Some might
then say that spacetime ‘reduces’ to non-spatiotemporal QG, but we prefer to stick with the notions
of ‘explanation’ or ‘derivation’, because there are many notions of ‘reduction’, some of which are
too strict. But we are also happy to speak of (weak) ‘emergence’ even when spacetime is derived,
because the gulf between a theory that does not assume spacetime, and one that does is so great.
Having spacetime or not makes a huge formal and conceptual difference, in particular because in
almost all theories prior to QG classical spacetime has apparently been one of the most basic posits.
Indeed, this very gulf makes one wonder what it could mean to derive spacetime, and whether it is
possible at all.
Before we proceed, we need to introduce some terminology to keep the discussion straight. The
issue is that the theories of QG often contain some object referred to as ‘space’, even when they do
not assume ‘space’ in the ordinary sense. For instance, there may be a ‘Hilbert space’, or a ‘dual
space’, or ‘Weyl space’, or ‘group space’. So we will refer to spacetime in the ordinary sense as
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‘classical’, or ‘relativistic’, or sometimes just ‘space’ or ‘spacetime’ when the context makes matters
clear. (We eschew the phrase ‘physical space’, since the other ‘spaces’ may well be part of the
fundamental physical furniture. We have previously used ‘phenomenal space’, to indicate that clas-
sical space is that of observable phenomena, according to the physicist’s use of ‘phenomenological’.
However, this leads to confusion with the philosophical doctrine of ‘phenomenalism’, so we have
dropped it.)
By classical or relativistic spacetime, we mean that theorized in QM (especially QFT) and
relativity, approximated in non-relativistic mechanics, and ultimately implicated in our observations
of the physical world. As stated, that is not an entirely homogeneous concept, so we will say more
later (§6) about exactly what features of classical spacetime are emergent from our theories of QG.
First, we turn to some challenges to the project of deriving spacetime.
3 Challenges to spacetime emergence
Space and time are so basic to both our manifest and scientific images of the world that at first the
mind boggles at the thought that they might be mere ‘appearances’ or ‘phenomena’, of some deeper,
more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal reality. Is a physics without spacetime even intelligible?
And if it is, is spacetime the kind of thing whose existence could be explained? At its core, this
book seeks to address these questions: on the one hand explicating the worlds described by theories
of QG, while on the other showing how spacetime can be derived from them. But to understand
the nature and methodology of that project, it is important here to unpack the mind boggling,
vertiginous panic about the very idea. Larry Sklar (1983) gave expression to this all too common
sentiment among philosophers (and physicists) when he wrote4
What could possibly constitute a more essential, a more ineliminable, component of our
conceptual framework than that ordering of phenomena which places them in space and
time? The spatiality and temporality of things is, we feel, the very condition of their
existing at all and having other, less primordial, features. A world devoid of color, smell
or taste we could, perhaps, imagine. Similarly a world stripped of what we take to be
essential theoretical properties also seems conceivable to us. We could imagine a world
without electrical charge, without the atomic constitution of matter, perhaps without
matter at all. But a world not in time? A world not spatial? Except to some Platonists,
I suppose, such a world seems devoid of real being altogether. (45)
According to Sklar, a non-spatiotemporal world is inconceivable, and thus presumably not even
metaphysically possible, let alone physically. This monograph is concerned with establishing the
possibility of a fundamentally non-spatiotemporal world, articulating the consequences of such a
possibility, and defending the idea that spacetime may be merely emergent in a perfectly acceptable
scientific explanation of the manifest world. So in this section we will discuss various more precise
ways that one might doubt the possibility of deriving spacetime.
4A note on terminology: we take ‘Platonists’ to be committed to the existence of abstract entities, such as
propositions, sets, love, and justice, but also to the existence of the concrete, physical, and spatiotemporal world.
Those who maintain that our world is fundamentally mathematical in nature and thus entirely consists in ultimately
abstract entities or structures are often labelled as ‘Pythagoreans’. Since we are interested not in whether there exist
abstracta, but in the possibility that all physical existence is grounded in non-spatiotemporal structures, we will refer
to those who maintain that a fundamentally non-spatiotemporal physical world is not devoid of “real being”—no
doubt historically inaccurately—as Pythagoreans. We take this Pythagoreanism to be Sklar’s target—and the one
of this monograph.
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First, in Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) we discussed the idea that a theory without spacetime
might be ‘empirically incoherent’. That is, any theory which entails that the observations appar-
ently supporting it are impossible, cannot receive empirical support (Barrett 1996)—it undermines
the very grounds for believing it. Since all observations ultimately involve events localized in space-
time, it might seem that theories without spacetime in their basic formulation are threatened with
empirical incoherence; the confirmation of such a theory might be ruled out a priori. However, it is
clear that a conflation is involved. (More) fundamental theories of QG are non-spatiotemporal in
the sense that spatiotemporal structure is missing in their more furniture; but it is perfectly con-
sistent to think that spacetime is present as an effective object, arising from the more fundamental
ones. (And that observation events can be identified within effective spacetime.) That is, QG will
not be empirically incoherent if the appearance of spacetime can be adequately explained, and of
course that is exactly what our case studies aim to do.
Second, while this book concerns the idea of ‘emergent’ spacetime as it arises in QG, one of
our key concerns has already arisen in discussions of a different kind of spacetime emergence. The
quantum mechanical wavefunction of N particles is not a function in ordinary space, but of the
positions of all the particles: Ψ(x1, y1, z1;x2, y2, z2; . . . ;xN , yN , zN ). Thus Ψ lives in ‘configuration’
space, in which there are three dimensions for each particle. Albert (1996) has argued that we should
take the wavefunction ‘seriously’ as the ontology of the theory, and conclude that configuration
space is more fundamental than regular space—that the three dimensions of experience are mere
appearances of the 3N dimensions of reality. Whatever the merits of that view, the general idea
has been attacked by Tim Maudlin (2007). In particular he argues as follows: one might
derive a physical structure with the form of local beables from a basic ontology that
does not postulate them. This would allow the theory to make contact with evidence
still at the level of local beables, but would also insist that, at a fundamental level,
the local structure is not itself primitive. ... This approach turns critically on what
such a derivation of something isomorphic to local structure would look like, where
the derived structure deserves to be regarded as physically salient (rather than merely
mathematically definable). Until we know how to identify physically serious derivative
structure, it is not clear how to implement this strategy. (3161)
We have italicized the key phrase here. Suppose that one managed to show formally that
certain derivative quantities in a non-spatiotemporal theory took on values corresponding to the
values of classical spatiotemporal quantities; one would then be in a position to make predictions
about derived space. However, according to the passage quoted, such a derivation (even if the
predictions were correct) would not show that spacetime had been explained. In addition, we have
to be assured that the formally derived structure is ‘physically salient ’. We agree with Maudlin
that physical salience is required of proper—one can say ‘explanatory’—derivations: otherwise one
simply has a formal, instrumental book-keeping of the phenomena. Indeed, we agree with him that
the issue is particularly pressing in theories of emergent spacetime. But we think that it can be
addressed in QG: one of the goals of this book is to investigate the (novel) principles of physical
salience for theories of QG, the principles whose satisfaction makes the derivations of spacetime
physically salient. In the following chapters we will look in detail at the derivations, to make clear
the assumptions and forms of reasoning that lie behind them. In the concluding chapter 10 we
will analyze what have learned, to start to explicate what makes a derivation of spacetime in QG
physically salient.
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But to explain that project—and its relevance to philosophy—we need to unpack the very notion
of physical salience, as we understand it.5
4 Physical salience
There is a subtlety about the way that Maudlin makes the point, however (which we did not
clearly address in Huggett and Wüthrich (2013)). For the target derived structure in itself is
prima facie physically salient: it is the physical datum to which the more fundamental theory is
answerable. (Perhaps a more fundamental theory will show that some less fundamental theory is
profoundly confused; but more generally one expects that existing, well-confirmed theories have
latched onto some genuine physical structures, and that new, better theories will simply explain
how, by subsuming the old in some broad sense.) So in that sense there is really no question of the
physical salience of the ‘derived structure’—in the sense of the structure to be derived.
Rather, Maudlin is talking about a formal derivation within a proposed new theory, and the
question of whether what is at present simply a mathematical structure, in numerical agreement
with the target structure, in fact explains it, and isn’t merely an instrument for generating pre-
dictions. We would break this question down into two interconnected parts (which will also help
illuminate what is involved in explanation here). First, the question of whether and how the basal
objects or structures of the more fundamental theory accurately represent physically salient ob-
jects and structures. As we shall see shortly, that question becomes far more pressing when none
of the putative objects or structures are supposed to be in spacetime. Second, does the formal
derivation of the phenomenal from the more fundamental make physical sense? That the derivation
exists shows that it makes sense at the level of the formalism, and especially that the derivation is
compatible with the mathematical laws. But, as Maudlin suggests, there is more to the question
of physical salience than that. And the question is especially pointed when one wonders how the
spatiotemporal could ever be ‘made’ of the non-spatiotemporal. We will illustrate these ideas with
a homely (and idealized in many ways) example.6
The ideal gas law tells that for a gas (in a box of fixed volume) pressure ∝ temperature. Ideal gas
theory says nothing about the microscopic composition of gases, so these are (among) the primitive
quantities of the theory, operationalized via pressure gauges (relying on forces measured via Hooke’s
law for springs), and thermometers (so relying on the linear expansion with temperature of some
substance). This is the phenomenon to be explained by the more fundamental theory, the kinetic
gas model, according to which the gas is composed of atoms with mass m, whose degrees of freedom
are their positions and velocities. The latter can be expressed by a vector ~V , with 3n components:
for each of the n atoms that make up the gas, three components, to describe the speed with respect
to each of the three dimensions of space. Each atom has a kinetic energy associated with its velocity
(1/2m~v2); the average kinetic energy is simply their sum, divided by n: denote this quantity
5We are grateful to Maudlin for conversations on this topic. We believe that we capture the essence of his
idea, even if we might differ in details; and especially regarding the depth of the problem in the case of spacetime
emergence. We do, however, want to point out an important difference between the cases of emergence from QG
and from configuration space: in the latter, but not the former, there is a way to formulate the theory in 3-space
(as single particle wavefunctions with a tensor product). Thus in QM (but not QG) Maudlin can argue that the
derivation isn’t physically salient, because the formulation from which it is derived is unnecessary in the first place.
That the crucial difference between QG on the one hand and QM (and GR) on the other lies in there being no
alternatives translates into a different status for spacetime functionalism in the two cases has been argued by Lam
and Wüthrich (forthcoming).
6The following has also been discussed in Huggett (2018).
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T (~V ) ≡ 1
2
m~V 2. (2)
Now one computes the atoms’ momentum change (per second per unit area) resulting from their
collisions with the sides of the box: assuming that the collisions are elastic, and that the atoms
are distributed evenly throughout the box and with respect to their velocities, one formally derives
that





Clearly the two quantities are proportional:
P (~V ) ∝ T (~V ), (4)
which has the form of the ideal gas law. However (and despite the suggestive names, P and T ) we
have so far said nothing to justify identifying the quantities with the pressure and temperature of
the ideal gas law; we have only noted a formal proportionality.
From this example we can abstract the following schema:
If (a) fundamental quantities X can be ‘aggregated’ into α(X) and β(X), such that (b)
f(α(X)) = g(β(X)) follows from fundamental laws, then the law f(A) = g(B) relating
less fundamental quantities A and B is formally derived.
The term ‘aggregated’ is supposed to be vague, in order to accommodate the many ways a deriva-
tion might proceed. But the underlying idea is that the more fundamental theory has (many)
more degrees of freedom than the less fundamental, and somehow the more fundamental must be
‘summarized’ by the less, for example by averaging, or by coarse-graining.
Maudlin’s claim is that formal derivability does not suffice to properly derive phenomena: in
particular, 3-dimensional space can be formally derived from the full 3N -dimensional configuration
space, but for Maudlin that does not make it a plausible, more fundamental alternative to ordinary
space. And more generally, one should worry that a merely formal condition does not distinguish
instrumental calculi from serious physical accounts. And indeed, further analysis of the derivation
of the ideal gas law shows that considerations of physical salience are at play.
In particular, P (~V ) is derived by assuming that the atoms are striking the sides of the box, and
exerting a force there: so acting exactly at the place and in the way that would produce a reading
on a pressure gauge. And T (~V ) is (according to the randomness assumption) the amount of energy
in any macroscopic region of the box, say the location of the bulb of a thermometer: and collisions
with the bulb will transfer kinetic energy to the molecules of the thermometer, causing thermal
expansion. Imagine if instead that P (~V ) only referred to the center of the box; or if T (~V ) referred
to a single atom in the box. Then the formal derivation would not be convincing. Or suppose that
instead of the atomic gas model we imagined that a gas was a continuous object, whose degrees of
freedom were somehow described by ~V , but not as the velocities of anything (certainly not atoms).
Then the formal consequences of kinetic gas theory could still be taken to hold, but they would no
longer have the interpretation that they do in the kinetic gas model; the whole derivation would
go through, but its physical meaning would be obscure. In short, the reason, in addition to their
proportionality, that we find P (~V ) and T (~V ) convincing as pressure and temperature, and not just
quantities following a similar law, is that they are spatiotemporally coincident with those quantities,
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and involve processes capable of producing the phenomena associated with those quantities. The
derivation is not merely formal, but also physically salient.
Continuing our schema:
A (non-instrumental) derivation of phenomena requires, in addition to a formal deriva-
tion, that (c) the derivation have physical salience.
Of course, this schema does not tell us what it is to be physically salient, but the example of
the ideal gas above illustrates two very important aspects, spatiotemporal coincidence, and the
action of a physically accepted mechanism. And this observation immediately reveals the problem
for the emergence of spacetime, because such criteria simply cannot be satisfied by derivations
from non-spatiotemporal theories, because they are explicitly spatiotemporal criteria. For instance,
it makes no fundamental sense in such a theory to even ask where a structure is. So if such
criteria are a priori constraints on science, then the QG program, to the extent that it involves
non-spatiotemporal theories, is in some serious trouble. However, a second example indicates the
contextuality of physical salience, and thereby the way in which QG can hope to achieve physical
salience in its derivations.
Figure 1: Descartes’ and Newton’s competing images of gravity. On the left is pictured Descartes’
vortex model: each cell represents a ball of rotating matter, with lines to indicate the direction
of rotation (e.g., those surrounding f, L, Y rotate about axes in the plane shown, while those
surrounding D,F, S rotate about axes perpendicular to the plane). The bodies at the center of a
cell represent suns: S is ours. On the right is the diagram from Newton’s Proposition I.1 proof
of Kepler’s equal areas law for a central force (essentially, conservation of angular momentum).
All that matters is the direction of the force (towards the point S), not any ‘hypothesis’ about its
nature. Ultimately Newton will apply the proposition to the case in which S is our Sun. (Public
domain, via Wikimedia Commons and Google Books.)
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Consider the competing Cartesian and Newtonian accounts of gravity, exemplified by illus-
trations from the Principles of Philosophy (Descartes 1644) and the Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy (Newton 1726), respectively: see figure 1. On the one hand we have the vor-
tices of Descartes, which aimed to provide a mechanical account of gravity, in terms of the motions
and collisions of particles. On the other there is Newtonian action at a distance, which allowed him
(as in Proposition I.1) to formulate and use his mathematical principles. We pass over Newton’s
own ambiguous attitude towards the causes of gravitation (his refusal to ‘feign hypotheses’ on the
one hand, but his speculations in the Optiks (Newton 1730) on the other). The point to which
we draw attention is the controversy between the Newtonians and Cartesians regarding the need
for mechanical explanation.7 For the latter, Newton might have captured the effects of gravity in
a formally accurate way, but offered no scientific explanation for the phenomena. For example,
consider Leibniz’s clear statement to Clarke:
If God would cause a body to move [round a] fixed centre, without any [created thing]
acting upon it . . . it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies. For, a free body
does naturally recede from a curve in the tangent. And therefore . . . the attraction of
bodies . . . is a miraculous thing, since it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies.
(Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence in Clarke et al. (1956))
We take Leibniz’s complaint to be exactly that Newton’s derivation of the phenomena lacks physical
salience, because only mechanical causes are physically salient explanations of unnatural motions.
Of course, the Newtonians were ultimately victorious, and this Cartesian condition of physical
salience was replaced by one that allows action at a distance, because of the success of universal
gravity, and the failure of mechanical alternatives, such as Leibniz’s. But that was not the end of
the story: through the development and empirical success of electromagnetic theory, culminating
in the development of special relativity, action at a distance was again rejected, with contact action
replaced by the demand for local field interactions—and hence the replacement of Newtonian gravity
with general relativity. Again, we understand this demand as a criterion of physical salience,
required for more than merely formal accounts. But even that is not the end of the story, for
quantum mechanics experimentally conflicts with that concept of locality, and so quantum non-
locality must be accommodated in some way. (Hesse 1961 is a classic telling of this tale.)
By now, three points are indicated by this story: first, questions of physical salience, here in the
form of the principles of locality, are genuine, controversial components of scientific enquiry. Second,
such principles are historically contingent, changing in step with major advances in physics. Third,
such changes are ultimately settled by, and epistemically justified by, empirical success: one of the
things that we learn in a scientific revolution is a set of criteria of physical salience for explanation
appropriate to the new domain of enquiry. Put this way, we see principles of physical salience
as part of what Kuhn called the ‘disciplinary matrix’ in the Postscript to the second edition of
(1962), or what Friedman (2001) refers to as the ‘relative, constitutive a priori’. Though changes in
the principles change wholesale what theories are even candidate explanations, we don’t infer any
catastrophic incommensurability here: as we said, innovations in physical salience are grounded in
empirical success, like all other scientific knowledge.
So we have a general answer to the problem raised earlier. How can a derivation of spacetime
from a non-spatiotemporal theory ever be physically salient? Well, it cannot satisfy the standards
7Note especially that we strictly distort the logic of Newton’s Principia here: as far as Proposition I.1 is concerned,
the forces could be impulses directed towards the point S. However, though Newton’s reader may not at that stage
know the nature of the force, for Newton the figure represents the action of universal gravitation.
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of physical salience that apply to theories with classical spacetime, but we should expect a non-
spatiotemporal theory to require new standards. And so the real question is what are those new
principles? Like Friedman, we see that question, and the development of such new principles as a
foundational, interpretational, conceptual—hence philosophical—endeavor. We shall elaborate on
how such a project is to be conducted in §7. We will see throughout the book how this endeavor
is ineliminably philosophical in the different approaches to QG. For now we want to illustrate the
problem with an example.
5 Non-commutative geometry
Of necessity, this section is somewhat more technical than the others, and could be skipped by
those not requiring a concrete illustration of how interpretational considerations come into play
in elevating a formal derivation into one (potentially) having physical salience. It elaborates an
example of a non-spatiotemporal theory already given, to show how one might come to view it as
a theory from which spacetime emerges.
We start with familiar, commutative geometry, for which xy = yx, in a smooth manifold of
points; let it be 2-dimensional for simplicity.8 Consider polynomials P(x, y) of x and y. These are
‘fields’, meaning that they return a numerical value at each point (x, y). They form an algebra
with respect to multiplication: this just means that when you multiply two polynomials together,
the result is another polynomial. Moreover, because xy = yx we have that P(x, y)Q(x, y) =
Q(x, y)P(x, y), so that the algebra is commutative. (Check with P(x, y) = xy and Q(x, y) = x2+y2
if you like.)
It may seem like a rather uninteresting structure, but in fact such algebraic relations alone con-
tain geometric information about the space: in this case, that it is smooth, that it is 2-dimensional,
and whether it is open or closed. This fact is shown by the important Gelfand-Naimark theorem
(1943), which is the foundation of ‘algebraic geometry’. Indeed, the whole structure of differential
geometry can be recast in algebraic terms. (An interesting application is Geroch’s (1972) formula-
tion of general relativity as an ‘Einstein algebra’; discussed by Earman (1989, §9.9) as a possible
response to the hole argument.)
For a mathematician, the question of what happens when the algebra is ‘deformed’ so that it is
no longer commutative is irresistible: so one sets xy−yx = iθ and sees what happens. (And similarly
in spaces of any dimensions.) Surprisingly, one finds that the structure necessary to cast geometry
in algebraic terms remains (at bottom, one can still define a derivative on the algebra, in terms
of which the other structure is defined). Moreover, the Euler-Langrange equation and Noether’s
theorem do not require commutativity, and so the structure of modern physics is preserved, even
in such a ‘non-commutative spacetime’—in a purely algebraic formulation.
But suppose such a physics were correct: how could it explain spacetime as it appears to us?
Specifically, how are we to understand events localized in space in terms of an abstract algebra?
When the algebra is commutative, the Gelfand-Naimark theorem lets us interpret the elements as
fields, P(x, y) related to regions of space; but what about the non-commutative case? The question
is just that which has concerned us in this chapter (and indeed the whole book): how can we derive
the appearance of classical spacetime from a non-spatiotemporal theory, in a physically salient way?
The obvious thing to try is to (a) interpret x and y not as elements of an abstract algebra, but
as fields in an ordinary plane: taking the value of the x and y coordinates at any point (x, y). Then
8This section is based on Huggett et al. (forthcoming). See also Lizzi (2009) for a more mathematical survey.
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(b) define a new binary operation, ?, such that x ? y− y ? x = iθ. Then (c) construct the algebra of
polynomial fields, but with ?-multiplication instead of regular (point-wise) multiplication. Indeed,
this is exactly how one typically proceeds in non-commutative geometry: in one formulation, the
operation is ‘Moyal-?’ multiplication9, and the fields form the ‘Weyl representation’ of the algebra.
The algebra of the fields with respect to ? will be that of the abstract non-commutative algebra,
and now we have referred that algebra to objects in an ordinary manifold. In particular, one could
talk about the local region in which such-and-such a field has values less than 1, say. Indeed, one
might now wonder whether we should throw away the abstract algebra, and just treat physics in
‘non-commutative geometry’ as really physics in commutative geometry, but with an unfamiliar
multiplication operation. In other words, wonder whether classical spacetime needs to be recovered
at all?
Huggett, Lizzi, and Menon (forthcoming) argue that indeed it must be, for the Weyl repre-
sentation has formal representational structure that exceeds its meaningful, physical content. In
particular, the concept of a region with an area smaller than θ—a forteriori that of a point—is unde-
finable in the theory. This can be seen in a couple of ways, but for instance the attempt to measure
positions more accurately leads to unphysical results. The conclusion is that, although the Weyl
representation contains points and arbitrarily small regions, they are purely formal, and do not
represent anything real: non-commutative geometry—even the Weyl representation—is physically
‘pointless’.
As a result, we cannot understand a point value of the Weyl fields as having any physical
meaning. Rather we need to understand the fields as complete configurations: the unit of physical
meaning for a field in non-commutative space is the function from each point to a value, P : (x, y)→
R; not its value, P(x, y) at any particular point (x, y). But the full configuration is equivalent to
the place of the field in the abstract algebra, and so we are back to the question of deriving locality.
Here is one way to proceed, using an ansatz proposed by Chaichian, Demichev, and Presnajder
2000 (discussed further in Huggett et al. forthcoming). They propose that an ordinary, commuting
field—the kind observed in classical spacetime—be related to a Weyl field W (x, y) by an operation
of ‘smearing’. One multiplies W (x, y) by a θ-sized ‘bell function’ about (X,Y ), and integrates over
the Weyl space coordinates x and y.10 The result is a new field Ω(X,Y ). Extrapolating from this
‘CDP ansatz’, the result of smearing is to introduce classical space into the theory. W lives in
Weyl space, whose status, we argue, is only that of a formal representation of the fundamental
algebra, while Ω should be interpreted as living in the physical space that we observe. We thus
interpret smearing as relating a function on one space to a value on another space: it relates the
non-commuting field W , represented as a function over Weyl space points (x, y), to the value of an
observed, commuting field Ω at physical space point (X,Y ). That it takes a function to a value is
just mathematics; that it relates Weyl and physical spaces is a substantive physical postulate.
However, it still makes no sense to consider Ω in regions smaller than θ: we have in fact
erased the unphysical information at such scales by smearing W . So strictly a single coordinate
pair (X,Y ) does not label a physical point. Rather, the proposal is that these smeared fields
are approximated by observable fields over regions greater than θ; thereby formally deriving the
latter, spatially localized objects from the former, purely algebraic objects. (In this case, we have
smearing as ‘aggregating’, in a very loose sense.) Of course, in our existing theories, fields live in
a full commuting spacetime, but that is an extrapolation from our actual observations of fields,















which are always over finite regions, to date larger than θ. On the proposed interpretation, then,
any information contained in Ω about regions less than θ is not only unobserved, but unphysical,
surplus representational ‘fluff’.
Now, nothing in the theory forces this picture as a physical story—it is merely an interpretational
postulate. (Though we claim that it is conceptually coherent.) However, it has empirical conse-
quences: the dynamics magnifies the θ-scale non-commutativity to observable scales (e.g., Carroll
et al. 2001). If those predictions are successful, then we have evidence that the underlying non-
commutative field theory and the interpretational postulate are correct. Imagining that situation
then, we claim that the situation is exactly analogous to that of the Newtonians regarding action
at a distance. That is, we would be justified in accepting the CBP ansatz and our interpretational
postulate as novel principles of physical salience: they regulate what constitutes a physically salient
derivation in the theory. In both cases, the final ground is the empirical success of the theory.
So it should be clear how the example illustrates our points about physical salience and our
scheme proposed above. In the first place we have argued that non-commutative geometry is
non-spatial, in the sense that it is ‘pointless’, and so must be understood as a purely algebraic
theory. Then we have explicated a possible formal derivation of localizable fields from this more
fundamental theory. And finally, we have sketched a scenario in which such a derivation leads to
successful predictions, and hence to the conclusion that the formal derivation is physically salient,
in fact explaining the appearance of localized fields, and ultimately classical spacetime. Of course,
we highlight that this discovery constitutes a change in what derivations ‘deserve to be regarded as
physically salient (rather than merely mathematically definable)’, to paraphrase Maudlin.
This is the pattern that we will see in more detail in the examples of the following chapters, and
to which we will return in the conclusion. In the following two sections we will investigate further
what is achieved by such a derivation (§6), and use our account of physical salience to indicate what
philosophy should aim to do when engaging emerging physics such as QG (§7).
6 Spacetime functionalism
The schema that we presented for a physically salient derivation relates closely (but not exactly)
to Lewis’ (1972) account of functional identification. Since ‘spacetime functionalism’, of various
varieties, has been recently discussed it is worth drawing the comparison, to better understand the
nature of the proposed emergence. Suppose, in idealization, that a theory T is formulated as a
postulate ‘T [t]’. t represents what was traditionally called the ‘theoretical’ terms, though we prefer
‘troublesome’ (Walsh and Button 2018, §3.1): the idea is that these are the new terms introduced
by the theory, and the ‘trouble’ is the question of how they garner meaning. ‘T [·]’ also involves
(traditionally) ‘observational’, or (according to Lewis) ‘old’, or (with Walsh and Button) ‘okay’
terms, and Lewis proposes that the t are defined in terms of them by
t = ιx T [x]. (5)
That is, ‘the t are (if anything) the extant, unique things that satisfy the theory postulate’. The
t are thus defined in terms of their nomic relations to one another and to the okay terms—i.e., in
terms of their ‘functional’ relations—and so (5) is a functional definition.11 As a result, the terms
11Lewis proposes in passing that the actual definition be modified to allow for approximate satisfaction of T [·]. In
our opinion that is always going to be the case in actual theories, so this modification is not optional but required, and
his discussion is a significant idealization. The harder question of how exactly the modification is to be implemented
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t are rendered semantically okay (though they may remain metaphysically problematic).
Suppose that we also hold a postulate R[r], where r and t do not overlap, so that our acceptance
R does not depend on our views on the troublesome terms of T .12 Further suppose that we come
to believe T [r]. Now,
T [r], t = ιx T [x]  r = t, (6)
so, by definition of the t, T [r] deductively entails the identity of the objects of R and T . Lewis’ point
is the epistemic one that such functional identifications are thus not inductive: given a functional
definition, once one accepts that the objects of R play the same roles as those of T , logic and
meaning alone commit one to accepting their identity.
Lewis offered electromagnetic waves and light as an example of the scheme, but of course his
point was that ‘when’ neuroscience showed that neural states played the functional roles of mental
states, then they would—as a matter of logic and definition—be identified. The subject of this
book also broadly fits Lewis’ scheme: theory T is our spacetime theory assumed by QFT and
relativity theory, while R is a theory of QG. Denote them ST and QG, respectively, and use ST
to functionally define any troublesome spacetime terms. Then, according to the schema of §4, a
physically salient derivation of ST from QG shows that ‘aggregates’ of QG, described using its terms
q, satisfy ST [·]—that they indeed play the functional roles of the objects of ST . So the identity
follows. However, there are differences to Lewis’ functionalism, which we will explain presently.
Now, how to turn Lewis’ scheme into a concrete plan for the functional reduction of spacetime?
The spacetime functionalism recently introduced by Lam and Wüthrich (2018, forthcoming) is based
on the general scheme in the spirit of Kim (2005, 101f) according to which a functional reduction
of higher-level properties or entities to lower-level properties or entities consists in two necessary
and jointly sufficient steps:13
(FR1) The higher-level entities/properties/states to be reduced are ‘functionalized’; i.e., one specifies
the causal roles that identify them, effectively making (5) explicit.
(FR2) An explanation is given of how the lower-level entities/properties/states fill this functional
role, so that we come to accept T [r].
If these two steps are fulfilled, then it follows that the higher-level entities/properties/states are
realized by the lower level ones.
Applying the template of functional reduction to the case of the emergence of spacetime in QG,
the two steps above become:
(SF1) Spacetime entities/properties/states, s, are functionalized by specifying their identifying roles,
such as spacetime localization, dimensionality, interval, etc. Effectively, one makes explicit
s = ιx ST [x].
(SF2) An explanation is given of how the fundamental entities/properties/states, q, postulated by
the theory of quantum gravity fill these roles, so that we come to accept ST [q].
is not carefully addressed by Lewis.
12Acceptance of a theory requires that it be meaningful, hence acceptance of R[r] requires that the r be referential,
and thus that any troublesome r can be functionally defined in terms of the okay r as in (5), mutatis mutandis. We
accept this assumption for Lewis’ cases, but we will see that things are more complex in the case of QG.
13Kim’s model involves three steps, where the second is to identify the entities in the reduction base that perform
the role at stake, and the third is to construct a theory explaining how these fundamental entities perform that role.
We subsume these two steps in our second stage.
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Again, if these two steps are fulfilled, it follows that the (perhaps aggregated) QG entities/proper-
ties/states are the spacetime entities/properties/states. In the following chapters, after explaining
each theory of QG and its conceptual foundations, we will follow this scheme in our discussions:
on the one hand describing the functional roles of spacetime entities/properties/states, and on the
other showing how the theory of QG proposes that those roles are played. Of course, given the
evidential state of QG, we do not claim that that these proposals are correct: we only describe how
the theories may functionally reduce spacetime, not—as far as we currently know–how they do.
Several remarks are in order regarding the functionalist approach to spacetime. First, it should
be made clear that we take emergence and reduction to be compatible with one another, and hence
functional reduction may serve as a template to explain the emergence of a higher-level feature, i.e.,
the fact that higher-level entities exhibit novel and robust behaviour not encountered or anticipated
at the more fundamental level.14
Second, there is a sense in which a functionalism about spacetime must start from a broader
conception of functional reduction than is usual in the familiar functionalisms in the philosophy
of mind or the philosophy of the special sciences. There, a mental or biological or other higher-
level property is understood to be determined by—indeed, usually identified with—its causal role
within the relevant network such as the network of mental or biological activities. If in spacetime
functionalism the roles are still supposed to be causal, then a much broader notion of ‘causal’ must
be at work, one that does not in any way depend on the prior existence of spacetime. As it is
not clear what that would be, it is preferable to formulate a notion of functionalism devoid of any
insistence that the functional roles be causal.
Third, the central claim of spacetime functionalism is that it is sufficient to establish only the
functionally relevant aspects of spacetime. In particular, it is therefore not necessary to somehow
derive relativistic spacetime in its full glory and in its every aspect in order to discharge the task.
Naturally, this raises the question of what these functionally relevant aspects of spacetime are—the
task of (SF1). As we will see in the following chapters, different approaches to QG take different
stances on what functions are to be recovered, though broadly speaking, all aim to recover functions
sufficient for the empirical significance of basic metrical and topological properties. Our stance will
be that the list of functions cannot be determined a priori from conceptual analysis of classical
spacetime theories, but by the twin demands of the empirical, and of the resources of the proposed
reducing theory. In short, part of the work of each chapter will be to identify the spacetime functions
recovered in the different approaches, and indicate how they relate to observation.
Fourth, the scheme permits a form of ‘multiple realizability’, as is typical of functionalism also
in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of the special sciences: (SF2) allows that different
(kinds of) fundamental entities might play one and the same functional role, i.e., that the ‘realizer’
of spacetime might have been by something other than what it in fact is. This liberal stance
spurs a concern that functionalism is too weak a condition to secure the emergence of spacetime,
that the true nature of spacetime is not exhausted by its functional roles, so that none of the mere
functional realizers could ever truly be spacetime. In particular, the worry continues, a rash reliance
on functionalism misses the qualitative nature of spacetime—some kind of spacetime ‘qualia’, as
it were—and it is precisely such qualitative features that make spacetime what it is, and which
cannot be recovered by mere functional realization. However, the case of spacetime is disanalogous
to that of mind: we agree with Knox (2014) who states that where “the fan of qualia [in the
philosophy of mind] has introspection, the fan of the [spacetime] container has only metaphor”
14As restated many times in our earlier publications, and in agreement with what we take to be the consensus in
philosophy of physics as stated, e.g., in Butterfield (2011a,b) and Crowther (2016, §2).
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(16), and with Lam and Wüthrich (2018) who agree that the “nature and status of the evidence in
favour of [mental] qualia may be equivocal, but the alleged ineliminable intrinsically spatiotemporal
but ineffable quality of spacetime substance remains positively elusive” (43f). We conclude with
them that the qualia worry in this form gets little if any traction in the spacetime case.15
Borrowing a distinction from Le Bihan (2018) between a “hard” and an “easy problem” of
spacetime emergence, spacetime functionalism amounts to the denial that there is a hard problem
of an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the fundamental, non-spatiotemporal and the emer-
gent, spatiotemporal realm. For the functionalist, what is to be shown—by a physically salient
derivation—is how the fundamental degrees of freedom can collectively behave in ways such that
they play the required spacetime roles. And nothing more. No special character, or essence, or
metaphysical nature need be accounted for. Functional identification requires no ‘luminosity’ of
light beyond the behavior of electromagnetic waves, or ‘consciousness’ beyond the functioning of
neurons. Or in our case, no special ‘spatiotemporality’ that the non-spatiotemporal could never ob-
tain. Once one has shown that the non-spatiotemporal plays the roles of the spatiotemporal—and
so is the spatiotemporal—no more need be said: one has a full scientific account of the emergence
of spacetime, and no ‘explanatory gap’ remains.
Fifth, functionalism shows how the goal of reduction can be the scientific explanation of the
functional roles of higher level entities/structures/states by lower level entities/structures/states
(and to nothing more). But, it is debatable to what exactly spacetime functionalism is ontologically
committed: substances, relations, entities, structures, states, or something else. We will not further
pursue this debate as we believe it to be orthogonal to the concerns of this book. Thus we hope
that the reader will forgive our switching between speaking of the spatiotemporal as if it were an
entity, or a structure, or a state, or something different yet again. We simply aim to avoid torturing
English more than necessary, and no deep philosophical commitment should, for instance, be read
into our using ‘spacetime’ as a noun.
Sixth, we are far from the first to suggest functionally defining space or spacetime. DiSalle (2006,
chapter 2) reads Newton’s Scholium to the definition in much this way (though Huggett 2012 dis-
agrees). Functionalist strategies have also become very visible in the philosophy of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, where Wallace (2012) deploys it in his defence of an Everettian interpretation
and Albert (2015, Ch. 6) in support of wave function monism. Those latter applications differ
from ours because they are concerned with recovering three-dimensional physical space. In con-
trast, spacetime functionalism in QG is commissioned with functionally recovering 4-dimensional
spacetime, and so relates to work by Knox (2013, 2014, 2019) in the context of classical spacetime
physics. For her, something ‘plays spacetime’s role’ and thus is spacetime “just in case it describes
the structure of inertial frames, and the coordinate systems associated with these” (2014, 15). In
GR, the metric field performs spacetime’s role in this sense and thus is identified with spacetime by
her. As the metric may itself not be fundamental but instead emerge from the collective behavior
of more fundamental degrees of freedom, she explicitly leaves open the possibility that the realizers
of spacetime’s functions may themselves not be fundamental (Knox 2013, 18). As the relationship
between the fundamental degrees of freedom and the emergent spacetime realizer is left untouched
15We also concur with Lam and Wüthrich (2018) in their rejection of the version of this concern articulated in Ney
(2015), who worries that if the fundamental entities are not already appropriately (spatio)temporal in their nature,
they cannot ‘build up’ or constitute spacetime as they are not the right kind of stuff (see also Hagar and Hemmo
2013). As diagnosed by Lam and Wüthrich, advocates of this worry seem to rely on an unreasonably narrow concept
of constitution. We might also object that if we surrendered to this worry, there would be no principled reason to
think that it would not also annihilate all other cases of presumed emergence and amount to an unyielding dualism.
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by Knox’s inertial frame functionalism, the latter does also not shed any light on it.16
Seventh and finally, there is an important but subtle difference in the application of Lewis’s
scheme to QG from that in the cases he has in mind. Suppose we accept a spacetime theory ST [s],
where whatever it is that performs the spacetime functions is denoted by the troublesome terms,
s. These, following Lewis, we take to be defined by
s = ιx ST [x]. (7)
The okay terms appearing in ST [·] would refer to matter of various kinds, its relative motions and
point-coincidences: so, for instance, the metric in GR might be defined locally in terms of its role
in determining motions under gravity or scattering amplitudes. We think that this part of Lewis’
picture—which corresponds to (SF1)—fits our cases well. But what about the second part of his
scheme, involving R[r]? Although the result is still a functional identification, its significance has
shifted somewhat, as we shall now explain.
Butterfield and Gomes (2020a; 2020b) analyze recent proposals for spacetime functionalism in
explicitly Lewisian terms. They emphasize, as we have, that in Lewis’ scheme theoretical iden-
tification follows by definition alone (once the rs are known to play the role of the ts), and that
functional identification is a species of reduction. But they also show how various spacetime and
temporal functionalisms follow the ‘Canberra plan’, according to which the troublesome ts are not
only defined by T , but are also ‘vindicated’ by their functional identification as rs. For instance, as
mental states, perhaps, turn out to be neural states so, in their examples, a temporal metric might
be identified with purely spatial structure; then, if neural states or spatial structures are on a firm
(or firmer) ontological footing than mental states or time, the identifications show that the latter
are equally well grounded. They are, that is, vindicated against any metaphysical suspicions raised
against them. That vindication is not by itself achieved by the functional definition (5) of the ts;
that merely makes the terms referential, so that they can be meaningfully employed. Put another
way, (FR1) alone does not vindicate the mental, for instance; (FR2) is also needed, to show how the
mental is part of the physical.17 Regarding these cases, we are in agreement with Butterfield and
Gomes emphasis of this important distinction, and its applicability to the cases that they discuss.
However, in our cases, for which R is some QG, the second step, while still involving a functional
identification, does not follow the Canberra plan, because the troublesome terms, q, of QG are non-
spatiotemporal, and so on a weaker, not firmer, footing—the ontological and semantic correlate of
empirical incoherence.18 Ontologically, as we have discussed, our physical and metaphysical cate-
gories assume spatiotemporality, and so the natures of the q are mysterious. Semantically, we can
expect an attempt to functionally define the qs as q = ιx QG[x] to fail. Lewis’ scheme for functional
definition requires that a theory have sufficient okay terms to uniquely define the troublesome ones:
if many collections of terms satisfy the putative definition, then it fails to establish reference. But
that is what one expects in a theory that breaks from established categories as radically as a non-
spatiotemporal one; the terms that we take to be okay are systematically spatiotemporal in some
way, and so are expected not to appear in QG. And indeed, we contend that the theoretical con-
cepts of the theories we consider in this book cannot be defined without appeal to spatiotemporal
16Cf. Lam and Wüthrich (2018, 40) and Lam and Wüthrich (forthcoming, §3) for a more detailed discussion of
inertial frame functionalism and how it relates to our project.
17Or put yet another way, the t are often troublesome both semantically and ontologically: the functional definition
takes care of the first problem, while the functional identification takes care of the second. When we use ‘troublesome’
we always mean semantically.
18Butterfield and Gomes do not claim otherwise, and indeed acknowledge that QG will look different (2020b, 3).
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concepts external to the basic formulation of the theory.
Given this situation, the significance of functional reduction is different from the way in which
Lewis (and Kim) proposed. Rather than following the Canberra plan of vindicating spacetime
objects by reduction, in our approach to QG things are reversed : the non-spatiotemporal objects
of QG are vindicated via their identifications with spatiotemporal objects. Clearly this approach
only works to the extent that the spatiotemporal is itself on a firm ontological footing, which of
course is a topic of endless debate. To skirt such debates in this book we will remain as neutral as
possible, and not take any stand on the metaphysical nature of spacetime features such as topology
or metricity, so that our conclusions remain valid for anyone who accepts them under whatever
interpretation.
Within Lewis’ framework, the vindication of the q works as follows. Suppose that non-spatiotemporal
QG[q] has been proposed. As explained, the q are semantically troublesome and ontologically sus-
pect. Moreover, until we accept that a derivation of (at least a fragment of) ST is physically salient,
we have no empirical grounds for accepting QG. Such a derivation will provide, not only grounds
for QG, but also define and vindicate the q. Introducing the ‘aggregate operator’ α(·), according to
our schema, when we have a physically salient derivation of spacetime properties, then we accept
α(q) = ιx ST [x]. (8)
In conjunction with ST [s] this entails that
α(q) = s (9)
more-or-less as for Lewis. However, the reversal of the Canberra plan makes several things different.
First, semantics. As noted, the q were not antecedently defined, but now can be through
their—or rather the α(q)’s—role as spacetime entities/structures/states. In other words, (8) is in
part definitional of the q: the troublesome non-spatiotemporal terms of QG can only be defined
with reference to spatiotemporal terms not native in QG. Moreover, (8) only succeeds in defining
the q if in physical fact they play the ascribed roles, and do merely mimic them formally; something
that the physical salience of the derivation will secure.19 Second, ontology. The qs are placed on a
firm ontological footing—are vindicated—when we accept that the α(q) are in physical fact those
entities/structures/states that play the spacetime role.20 Once again, acceptance of the physical
salience of the derivation secures just that.
Finally, epistemology. In Lewis’ scheme, we have independently accepted theories of, say, neu-
ronal and mental states, and later discover that they play the same functional roles, entailing that
they are identical. In our case, the acceptance that QG’s objects (or rather their aggregates) play
the same roles as ST ’s objects, and hence are identical with them, is simultaneous with our accep-
tance of QG. In general terms, the evidence for R[r] is no longer antecedent (or independent) of the
evidence for T [r], but rather the very same evidence. As such the epistemic calculus is different. In
one case, observations of neuronal states can be made independently of mental states, and we only
have to show that they perform the relevant functions: producing suitable behaviors, for instance.
In the other, observations are not independent of spacetime states, and have to support both the
truth of a theory of QG, and that its objects perform the right functions. To give evidence, that is,
19(8) is not purely definitional, since it also also involves an existential commitment that the qs exist. And it need
not fully define q; we also still have that q = ιx QG[q] by definition.
20In Huggett and Wüthrich (2013, 284), we described this approach to vindication as physical salience flowing
down to the q ‘from above’.
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that the formal derivation of those functions is indeed physically salient. As a result, although the
deductive logic is the same, the empirical inference to the premises of the identification is different,
and indeed weaker. However, as we say, it is of the normal empirical kind, and we fully expect it
to be made for a successful theory of QG. There is no special ground for skepticism.
So much for the functionalism that lies behind the investigations of this book. But why is finding
a functional reduction in any way a philosophical task, rather than one for physics?
7 The role of philosophy in physics
As we noted, the theories that we plan to investigate are all speculative at present, faced with
considerable formal and empirical uncertainties. So what can we hope to learn from a philosophical
enquiry into something that is at worst likely false, or at best a work in progress? We see the
situation as characteristic of emerging fundamental physics (and perhaps other sciences). The
process of discovery takes place along various fronts: obviously, new empirical work constrains
theory and requires explanation; also obviously, new mathematical formalisms are tried out and
explored; less obviously, but just as importantly, conceptual analysis of the emerging theory is
undertaken. In particular, we want to stress that this last kind of work is carried out concurrently
with the empirical and theoretical. One should not view interpretation as something that merely
happens after an uninterpreted formal structure is presented, but as an inextricable aspect of the
process of discovery. As such, it is something that has to be carried out on inchoate theories, in
order to help their development into a finished product.
We claim that this view is supported by the historical record: we have in fact already seen
this for Newtonian gravity. But one can equally well point to the absolute-relative debate in the
development of the concept of motion, or 19th century efforts to come to grips with the physical
significance of non-Euclidean geometry. These debates did not wait until after a theory was devel-
oped to clarify its concepts; rather they had to be carried out simultaneously, as an integral part
of the development of the theory (see DiSalle (2006)). Of course we are hardly the first to realize
that such philosophical issues have to be addressed together with the empirical and theoretical
ones. Many of Kuhn’s (1962) arguments illustrate this point, and more recently it is a major theme
of Friedman (2001). But while we agree with their focus on philosophical, conceptual analysis as
an essential part of theory construction, we don’t intend to get involved in issues involving the a
priori or incommensurability, instead we want to emphasize the practical role for analysis in the
development of QG.
In the search for a new fundamental theory, the goal is—as it was for Einstein and for Newton—a
new formalism plus an interpretation that connects parts of the formalism to antecedently under-
stood aspects of the physical world, especially to the empirical realm. That is, an interpretation
of how the more fundamental plays the functional roles of the less fundamental. And of course
that means undertaking the project that we have been talking about in this section, of deriving
spatiotemporal predictions from theories of QG. But one never simply co-opts or invents formal-
ism without some eye on the question of how it represents existing physics of interest; and as the
formalism is developed it becomes possible to see more clearly how and what the new formalism
represents. Addressing this question is of on-going importance for finding the right formalism for
the area under study. Moreover, constructing such a formalism does not typically proceed in a
monolithic fashion; instead different fragments of theory are proposed, investigated, developed or
abandoned. For example, think of the development of the standard model of QFT from the early
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days of quantum mechanics. So the analysis of concepts of the new theory in terms of existing
physics is often faced with a range of half-baked theories and models. All the same, lessons about
how a more developed, less fragmented theory can be found depend on asking how the fragments
represent known physics—the answers are potential clues to how the finished product could do so.
We believe that contemporary QG should be thought of in just this way—certainly the frag-
mentation is real! Our primary goal is to look at a range of the half-baked fragments and ask how
they connect to spatiotemporal phenomena. Since they do not do so in a familiar way, in terms of a
continuous manifold of points, the question becomes ‘how does spacetime emerge from the underly-
ing physics?’. We hope, therefore, that by concentrating on the question of emergence, aside from
all the other issues involved in the search for a theory of QG, we will be performing a service to
physicists working in QG, by focussing their attention on what is already known—and reminding
them that success depends on making it part of the search. Naturally, we do not expect to find
solutions of the order of Newton or Einstein! Indeed, a lot of what we shall do is draw out answers
already given by physicists; we believe that careful philosophical analysis of these answers can help
clarify them to reveal strengths and weaknesses, and hence aid progress. (Moreover, because we are
focussed on this quite narrow issue, we can survey a wider range of approaches than most physicists
actively study, and so provide a helpful overview of the topic.) And hence we believe that in the
examples we will consider there are important clues for the development of QG which philosophical
analysis can reveal.
8 The plan for the book
Thus, our primary aim is to see how spacetime disappears and re-emerges in several approaches to
QG, and to show how this is not just a technical issue for physicists to solve, but instead elicits
numerous foundational and philosophical problems. As we work through three such approaches—
causal set theory (CST), loop quantum gravity (LQG), and string theory, which were all briefly
introduced in §2—, we bring these philosophical issues to the fore and will concentrate our discussion
on them.
It is common to divide approaches to QG into those which start out from GR and attempt
to convert it into a quantum theory of gravity in different ways and into those departing from
the standard model of particle physics and aim to add gravity to the other three forces of the
standard model. In the former approaches such as CST and LQG, we would not expect the resulting
theories to fold in the physics of the standard model, whereas the latter, such as string theory, will
presumably deliver more encompassing, unifying theories. It is clear that either way, a theory of
QG needs to address how the geometrical degrees of freedom of spacetime interact with the matter
degrees of freedom present in the world. But it is also clear that both kinds of degrees of freedom
may well look very differently from what we are used to from other theories.
The first two chapters after this one focus on CST. Chapter 2 introduced the basic kinematic
axiom of the theory and shows how in it at least space disappears rather radically from the fun-
damental ontology, but also that temporal aspects do not all survive. This raises the immediate
question of the relationship between the fundamental ontology of causal sets with that of rela-
tivistic spacetimes, a question we start to address in chapter 2. Although some functions of space
can tentatively be recovered, what is needed is a more systematic understanding of how causal
sets generically give rise to worlds which appear to be spatiotemporal in ways described, to good
approximation, by GR. The way in which this ‘derivation’ of spacetime is attempted in CST is
sketched and discussed in chapter 3. In this chapter, we will discuss the role played by introducing
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a dynamics for the theory. We will argue that the emergence of spacetime in CST is closely tied to
deeply philosophical questions regarding the metaphysics of space and time.
Chapter 4 and 5 turn to LQG, retracing the disappearance and emergence of spacetime in this
approach. Just as CST, LQG builds a research program around what it takes to be GR’s central
lesson. In the case of LQG, this is the insight that GR postulates a truly dynamical spacetime,
interacting with other fields. The demand is encoded in the theory’s general covariance. LQG seeks
to articulate a theory of QG by delicately applying known quantization procedures to a Hamiltonian
formulation of GR. Chapter 4 chronicles and discusses whether and, if so, how this approach leads
to the disappearance of spacetime. Unlike CST, it is time whose existence is much threatened in
LQG than space. Chapter 5 seeks to understand how relativistic spacetime then emerges from the
fundamental theory, finding, again, close ties to philosophical questions.
Other approaches apply the strategies of perturbative QFT—so successful in understanding the
other forces—to quantize gravity. The technique calls for starting a system in which the fields do
not interact to build up a space of states: a lowest, vacuum state, and states of discrete, particle-like
‘quanta’. Generally such a system is solved exactly, and the vacuum describes an obvious classical
state. Then one introduces a small interaction, and uses approximation techniques to study the
behavior of fields: especially the scattering of quanta. This approach was applied to gravity early
on: Minkowski spacetime is a natural vacuum, and the gravitational field has quanta known as
‘gravitons’, very analogous to photons, the quanta of the electromagnetic field. Indeed, quite a lot
is known about the quantized gravitational field through such methods, and this knowledge is taken
as a constraint on a successful theory of QG. However, divergences prevent the theory from being
generally applied; moreover, these divergence cannot be adequately resolved by ‘renormalization’
as they can for other QFTs.21
String theory works within this approach, but with one important tweak: instead of quantized
point like particles, it deals in quantized 1-dimensional, string-like objects. This, it appears, makes
all the difference to the finiteness of the theory. Chapters 6-9, address the emergence of spacetime
in string theory. Chapter 6 is a fairly technical introduction of the theory, aimed at philosophers
of physics: it aims to be more intuitive, and more explicit about the conceptual and physical
framework than physics textbooks usually are. For those who have some familiarity with classical
and quantum field theory, it will tell you what you need to know about strings. Chapter 7 deals
with string ‘dualities’: some fascinating and powerful symmetries that arise when space has an
interesting topology (a cylinder, say). We argue that they are the kind of symmetries are not
merely observational, but ‘go all the way down’, showing that string theory does not possess, in its
basic objects, familiar spacetime properties, such as definite size or topology; it is for largely that
reason that spacetime ‘emerges’. Chapter 8 is again fairly technical, explaining and analyzing in
some detail the derivation of the Einstein field equation for gravity, from string theory. This is a
central part of emergence, for it derives the spacetime metric, giving empirical content to spacetime
geometry, and gives rise to GR. Finally, chapter 9 draws on the material of the previous chapters
to argue that indeed spacetime emerges in string theory, how this happens, and what ‘principles of
physical salience’ are required.
The final, concluding, chapter draws on the results of the previous ones to return to the question
of this introduction. How can we see that the derivations of spacetime that we have investigated are
themselves physically salient, and what principles can we extract from them that might be helpful
in the search for QG?
21See Kiefer (2004, chapter 2) for a very nice survey of QFT of the gravitational field.
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